22 of 24 - Fatal accident
Back to the national construction company
After
several years during which I worked in Qatar for a consultant and co-ran my own safety consultancy in the UK, Insight Safety, I re-joined the group and was
offered the senior safety role in Dubai with dozens of officers, high-profile builds, and a safety culture still
finding its footing. It was here, amid the dust and heat, that I realised just how far I’d come from those early mornings in Cheltenham.
The
work demanded not just technical oversight but cultural fluency, logistical
coordination, and the ability to navigate layered hierarchies—contractors,
consultants, and clients, each with their own expectations and interpretations
of “safe practice.” It was a place where heat, haste, and hierarchy collided
daily, and where the margin for error was often razor-thin.
One of the projects I worked on involved very deep trenching—deeper than anything I’d seen in the UK. Unsupported, but properly and safely stepped, carved into compacted sand that would have had a British inspector reaching for the stop notice. But here, it was normal and expected. Dewatering pumps thrummed in quiet rhythm, and the excavation process moved with a kind of choreography. I asked for an explanation of the control measures. Then I asked again. Eventually, I was convinced—not just by the paperwork, but by the sequencing, the redundancy, the inspection regime and the quiet competence of men who knew this ground.
Then
my UK boss arrived. He frowned at the depth, the absence of shoring, the
unfamiliar soil. “You’re comfortable with this?” he asked.
“I
wasn’t,” I said. “But I’ve seen it work.”
He
paused. Not agreement, but a kind of grudging trust. The trench held.
Al Ain, a few years earlier.
The
trench was narrow, unstable, and threaded through a congested urban corridor.
The spoil was piled right to the edge—compacted deliberately to store more. The
ground had been fractured by decades of rework, and the signs were there: minor
cave-ins, tension cracks, the quiet language of collapse. The local safety man
saw it. He issued a stop work notice. The site manager ignored it.
Three
men died when a large chunk of the trench wall collapsed and engulfed them.
I
walked the trench the day after. The silence was different—not procedural, but
moral. The excavation had spoken. No one had listened. My report was scathing.
I didn’t soften the language. There are moments when diplomacy is complicity.
Dismissals
followed. Not enough, perhaps. But something.
A final fatality
Our
work in Dubai included road layouts, buildings, and a specialist tower to accommodate a scenic ride. The
ride featured a tower encircled by a doughnut-shaped observation platform,
engineered to ascend and descend, offering passengers a panoramic view. This is the scene of the last fatal accident that I investigated.
The
tower itself was a straight-sided tube, 55 metres high, with an internal
diameter of just under 3 metres. Its external face housed a rack-and-pinion
system alongside the power train—an articulated cable control device that rose
and fell with the platform. This power train resembled a
flexible spine, composed of hinged, interlinked segments that guided electrical
and communication cables as the platform moved. One end delivered power and
data to the platform; the other terminated at the tower’s summit, where the
cables were routed internally down to the control centre, located below ground
level at the base.
External
construction was arduous: major excavation, heavy rebar installation, and
complex concrete pours preceded the intricate assembly of the platform itself.
But it was the internal work that proved most extreme. Daytime temperatures
inside the tower tube rendered most tasks untenable. While forced-air ventilation
helped at the base, it was ineffective higher up. Much of the internal work was
therefore carried out at night. The most demanding operations occurred near the
summit, where the cables entered the structure. Accessing this zone required
highly skilled workers—electricians and fitters trained in rope access
techniques—operating in confined, overheated conditions.
This
ride was a one-off. There was no tried-and-tested assembly plan, no detailed
study of how to fit the hundreds of bespoke components. Many of the more
unusual elements were installed through trial and error. One such
component—critical to housing the internal cables at the point of entry—proved
especially problematic.
So, consider this. You’re a seasoned technician, confident
in your rope access skills, having worked on countless rides. But this one is
different. You’re fifty metres up, inside a pitch-black, narrow metal tube. The
air is hot and stale. Just reaching the work face is a trial. And when you
arrive, you realise your rigging doesn’t give you the access you need. The
component lies on the far side—180 degrees across the 3m void.
You unclip. Just for a moment. You reach across, misjudge
the handhold, or the foothold. And you fall.
I arrived on site the morning after the fall. The tower
stood as it always had—silent, vertical, indifferent. There were no signs of
disruption from the outside. No broken panels, no scattered tools. Just the
knowledge that someone had died inside it.
The investigation began with the usual protocols: access
logs, crew rosters, equipment checks. But the truth lay not in the paperwork,
nor in the schematics. It lay in the geometry of the space inside the tube, the choreography of
the task, and the quiet assumptions that had gone unchallenged.
The component in question had been modified late in the
build. A minor adjustment, made to accommodate a cable bend radius that hadn’t
been accounted for in the original design. It wasn’t flagged as a risk. It
wasn’t even documented properly. But it changed the work face—shifted it just
far enough to make the standard rigging ineffective.
We reconstructed the sequence. Rope access, partial reach,
uncoupling. A moment’s misjudgement. A fall.
Just a worker doing what he’d done a hundred times before,
in a structure that hadn’t been built a hundred times. The ride was a one-off.
So was the accident.
Halfway through the investigation, I had to leave Dubai. The
reasons were practical, but the timing was brutal. The site—the tower, the
heat, the geometry—remained behind. I continued the inquiry from a desk
thousands of miles away, speaking into a screen early in the morning , relying
on an assistant still on the ground.
It was surreal. The tower I knew intimately now appeared
only in grainy video feeds and still images. The sounds of the site—metal on
metal, the low hum of ventilation—were replaced by buffering audio and the
occasional dropped call. I found myself asking for angles, for measurements,
for gestures that I would normally take in with a glance. My assistant became
my proxy: climbing, photographing, describing. I trusted him, but it wasn’t the
same.
The stress came not from the technical complexity, but from
the dislocation. I was still responsible, still accountable, but no longer
present. I couldn’t feel the heat inside the tube. I couldn’t trace the cable
path with my own hands. I couldn’t stand at the base and look up.
We reconstructed the sequence. We reviewed the rigging. We
examined the component. But the work was mediated—filtered through screens,
compressed into reports. The human cost, though, remained unfiltered.
I remember one call in particular. My assistant described
the reach, the misalignment, the probable misstep. I listened, took notes,
asked questions. And then I sat back and stared at the screen. It was silent.
Just a still image of the inside of the tube. Black, narrow, unforgiving.
That was the moment I understood the limits of remote
investigation. You can analyse, interpret, report. But you cannot bear witness.
Not properly. Not fully.
We wrote the report. The tower was operational and the ride ascended and descended as designed. Passengers
marvelled at the view.
But I still think about the geometry. The heat. The silence
inside that tube. And the moment when a man reached across the void, and didn’t
come back.
In the months that followed, I found myself withdrawing. Not
dramatically. No grand declarations. Just a quiet erosion of appetite—for the
meetings, the reports, the next project. That empty, disembodied feeling I’d
carried through the remote investigation didn’t fade. It settled.
I retired earlier than I’d planned. Not because I couldn’t
do the work, but because I no longer wanted to. The distress wasn’t just
emotional—it was ethical. The conclusion I reached was simple, and depressing:
that although there were countless reasons why the job was almost impossible to
build safely, and although the designers, planners, technical experts and we
contractors could all have prevented that death, none of us did.
It wasn’t malice. It wasn’t neglect. It was something
quieter. A shared assumption that someone else had checked, someone else had
tested, someone else had thought it through. And in that silence, a man fell.
I’ve carried that with me. Not as guilt, exactly, but as a
kind of residue. A reminder that technical mastery is not enough. That safety
isn’t just a checklist—it’s a culture. And that sometimes, the most dangerous
thing on site isn’t the machinery or the geometry. It’s the absence of a voice
saying: “This isn’t safe.”
Final Briefing
On my last day at work, I attended a group safety meeting
held in a corporate room inside a football stadium. A few of the old faces were
there—colleagues I’d worked alongside for years—but there were many more younger
ones I didn’t recognise. New recruits, perhaps. Or just new to me.
I stayed through the morning session and lingered until
lunch was done. Just before I left, the Group Safety Director invited me to say
a few words. I kept it simple. I told them that over the years I’d seen real
change: better awareness, safer tools, and a shift in boardroom attitudes that
had made working lives safer and more dignified. I reminded them that they were
doing important work in one of the most dangerous industries, and that they
should feel proud of their contribution.
Then I stepped away—quietly, without ceremony—leaving the
room to those who would carry it forward.
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